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THE PROPER CASE FOR ESTOPPEL AGAINST FEDERAL
ADmINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Before embarking upon a course of conduct, a "person" 1 may desire.
to learn whether or not his conduct will be affected by a federal statute,
and if so, to what extent. It is quite likely that he will turn to some
federal administrative agency in his search for the answers to those
questions. Should he be successful in obtaining some form of representa-
tion from these agencies, he will quite likely guide his conduct accord-
ingly. After he has placed reliance upon that representation, he may find
that some entirely different result is imposed by the agency at a later
date, generally to his detriment. His disappointment occasioned by such
agency conduct, may be the result of a change in attitude on the part
of the agency, a difference of opinion between officials within the agency,
or even a change in the agency's personnel.
Considering such treatment wholly unjust and inequitable, he may
turn to the courts in an effort to prevent the agency from changing its
position in regard to him, on the ground of estoppel. When he does, it is
very likely that he will encounter the statement, "there can be no estoppel
against the government or its agencies." 2
No one universally-propounded reason appears to lie behind the doc-
trine that estoppel will not operate against governmental agencies. Nev-
ertheless, the most pervading consideration seems to be that there should
be no interference with the sovereignty of the government,3 for the reason
1 As defined in Section 2(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237,
5 U.S.C. § 1001b (1946): "'Person' includes individuals, partnerships, corporations,
associations, or public or private organizations of any character other than agen-
des."
2 Spencer v. Railroad Retirement Board, 166 F.(2d) 342, 343 (3d Cir. 1948);
United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 163 F.(2d) 633, 641 (10th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
333 U.S. 833, 68 S.Ct. 459, 92 L.Ed. 1117 (1948) ; Walker-Hill Co. v. United States,
162 F.(2d) 259, 263 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 771, 68 S.Ct. 85, 92 L.Ed. 356
(1947); NLRB v. Phillips Gas & Oil Co., 141 F.(2d) 304, 305 (3d Cir. 1944);
Brown v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 132, 133 (S.D. Mo. 1952); United States v.
Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 64 F. Supp. 269, 270 (S.D. W. Va. 1946).
3 Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915, 920 (D. Neb.
1944) (estoppel would interfere with the proper discharge of governmental duties,
or curtail the exercise of its police power). The opinion in this case points up an
important distinction in regard to estoppel against the government - whether the
governmental function involved is proprietary or sovereign. In the case of proprie-
tary functions, estoppel is more liberally applied against government agencies and
officers. The relatively few instances in which federal administrative agencies are
called upon to carry out proprietary functions renders this aspect of the problem
(234)
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that the government's welfare, being of greater importance, outweighs
individual injury in a particular case. 4 Ultimately, however, the basis for
the doctrine of no estoppel against government agencies flows from the
doctrine of non-suability of the sovereign, which may not be waived by
administrative officials or lost through mere misrepresentation whether
inadvertent or designed.'
The conclusiveness and apparent universality of this rule that estop-
pel will not operate against government agencies, as well as the fre-
quency with which it has appeared in decided cases, might suggest that
the matter was well settled and rarely raised in issue by litigating parties.
The contrary is true, however. The reason for this lies in the fact that
many courts qualify their statements of the rule to the effect that
estoppel may operate against government agencies in a "proper" 6 or
"extraordinary""7 case. What is the "proper" case? What are its ele-
ments? Is there, or has there been, any situation or situations in which
a party, having relied upon some agency's representation, has succeeded,
or could succeed, in having the court prevent the agency from proceeding
under an inconsistent position to his detriment? It has been suggested
that the government should turn square corners in dealing with its
citizens.8 Under what circumstances does that principle become applic-
able? This is our problem, for in none of the cases examined, where the
suggestion of the "proper" case was made, did the court attempt to
define it or set out its elements.9
insignificant as a guide to the "proper" case. American Surety Co. v. United States,
112 F.(2d) 903, 906 (10th Cir. 1940) (estoppel rejected where its application would
frustrate the purpose of the laws of the United States or its public policy). Montana
Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.(2d) 491, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947,
71 S.Ct. 532, 95 L.Ed. 683 (1951); NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F.(2d) 51,
55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 795, 64 S.Ct. 848, 88 L.Ed. 1084 (1944) (the
public cannot be deprived of the protection of a statute because of the mistaken
action or lack of action on the part of a public official). Also see, Manning, The
Applicaion of the Doctrine of Estoppel Against the Government in Federal Tax
Cases, 30 N.C.L. Rav. 356, 370 (1952).
4 Walker-Hill Co. v. United States, 162 F.(2d) 259, 263 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 771, 68 S.Ct. 85, 92 L.Ed. 356 (1947).
5 Coleman v. United States, 100 F.(2d) 903, 905 (6th Cir. 1939).
6 Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F.(2d) 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Knapp-
Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.(2d) 863, 864 (8th Cir. 1944); Ritter v.
United States, 28 F.(2d) 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1928); Walker v. United States, 139
Fed. 409, 413 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1905); Barnett Inv. Co. v. Nee, 72 F. Supp. 81, 82
(W.D. Mo. 1947); Elrod Slug Casting Mach. Co. v. O'Malley, 57 F. Supp. 915, 920
(D. Neb. 1944).
7 James Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1151 (1928).
8 Howbert v. Penrose, 38 F.(2d) 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1930). This is a turnabout
of the original phrase of Mr. Justice Holmes: "Men must turn square corners when
they deal with the Government." Rock Island, A. & L. R.R. v. United States, 254
U.S. 141, 41 S.Ct. 55, 56, 65 L.Ed. 188 (1920).
9 See note 6 supra.
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The Doctrine of Estoppel
An attempt to find the answer to these questions through an examin-
ation of decided cases leads to several difficulties, not the least of which
is the determination of the meaning of estoppel. The operation of the
principle of estoppel as a bar to prevent a party from acting in a certain
manner, or asserting certain statements, extends throughout nearly the
entire field of law.10 The generally accepted definition of estoppel, how-
ever, is "the commission of an act or the concealment of facts to one who
is ignorant of the matter with the intent to induce and cause the other
party to act upon it or change his position to his detriment or dis-
advantage." "
Nevertheless, in applying the doctrine, many courts have introduced
liberalizing modifications, sometimes accompanying the modification
with a name change, such as, "quasi estoppel," 12 "the duty of consist-
ency," 13 or "estoppel by election." 14 As stated under the more liberal
modifications, 15 the term estoppel implies that one who by his deed or
conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner will not be
permitted to adopt an inconsistent attitude or course of conduct and
thereby cause loss or injury to such other.16 Some of the traditional ele-
ments of the generally accepted definition are eliminated: e.g., intent
that the representation be relied upon; necessity that the person making
the representation have knowledge; requirement of diligent investigation
on the part of the person invoking the doctrine.
10 19 Am. JUR. Estoppel § 1 (1939). Brown v. Rosenbaum, 175 Misc. 295, 23
N.Y.S.(2d) 161, 171 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (stare decisis); Clark v. Baranowski, 111 Ohio
St. 436, 145 N.E. 760, 761 (1924) (res judicata).
11 Olbert v. Key, 93 S.W.(2d) 1048, 1051 (Mo. 1936); 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE 191-2 (5th ed., Symons, 1941).
12 Robbins v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 403, 407 (Ct. Cl. 1937); Mahoning
Inv. Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 622, 629 (Ct. Cl. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S.
675, 54 S.Ct. 526, 78 L.Ed. 1064 (1934) ; Atlas, The Doctrine of Estoppel in Tax
Cases, 3 TAX L. REV. 71 (1947). In Sterns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-2,
54 S.Ct. 325, 78 L.Ed. 647 (1934), Cardozo, speaking for the Court, observed:
"Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes
as a waiver. The label counts for little. Enough for present purposes that the dis-
ability has its roots in a principle ... that no one shall be permitted to found any
claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong. [Citation omit-
ted]. A suit may not be built on an omission induced by him who sues."
13 Orange Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 131 F.(2d) 662, 663 (5th Cir.
1942); Alamo Nat. Bank of San Antonio v. Commissioner, 95 F.(2d) 622, 623 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 577, 58 S.Ct. 1047, 82 L.Ed. 1541 (1938); 10A
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 60.16 n. 77a (Supp. 1952).
14 Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F.(2d) 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Eichelberger
& Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.(2d) 874 (5th Cir. 1937); United States v. Brown,
86 F.(2d) 798, 799 (6th Cir. 1936).
15 See Horn v. Cole, 51 N.H. (3 Shirley) 287, 289 (1868); 3 POMEROY, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 180.
16 See notes 12, 13 and 14 supra.
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Four elements remain:
(a) There must be a representation in some form by the party to
be estopped.
(b) There must be a reliance upon that representation by the
party pleading estoppel.
(c) There must be an attempt by the party to be estopped to
take an inconsistent position.
(d) There must be detriment, actual or threatened, to the party
invoking the doctrine.
It was in this latter view of the term "estoppel" that the search in-
volved in this article for the "proper" or "extraordinary" case was
conducted.
Agency Representations
Although federal administrative agencies make a vast array of repre-
sentations in a variety of forms, they can be divided into two general
categories: (a) those which assert new law; and (b) those which apply
existing law to factual situations. Agency statements propounding new
law, or legislative rules, are generally issued under express and specific
authority granted by some congressional enactment. On the other hand,
statements or actions purporting to apply the existing law to factual
situations, either real or hypothetical, referred to as interpretative rules,
are issued under general grants of poWer to carry out congressional
intent; they are seldom specific, and frequently implied rather than
express .
1
Where the agency pronouncement upon which the affected party
relies is a legislative rule, the question of estoppel generally does not
arise. New law expounded by the agency under specific grants of author-
ity has the force of a statute, and the courts generally require obedience
to such statutory law on the part of the agency as well as by ofher
parties affected.' 8 When the agency attempts to adopt a position in-
consistent with its own legislative rule, the rule itself is generally invoked
to prevent such conduct rather than the equitable appeal upon the
grounds of estoppel.
Representations applying existing law can be divided roughly into
two categories: (a) impersonal pronouncements made to others or to
the public generally; and (b) those made to the party on a personal
basis. The form of such representations varies considerably. They may
occur in the form of interpretative regulations, bulletins, speeches, rul-
ings, memoranda, letters, statements, releases, long-standing practices,
inaction and possibly others.
17 DAvis, ADnNISTRATiVE LAW § 55 (1951).
18 Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 60 S.Ct. 18, 84 L.Ed. 101 (1939);
Schafer v. Helvering, 83 F.(2d) 317 (D.C. Cir.), afj'd, 299 U.S. 171, 57 S.Ct. 148,
81 L.Ed. 101 (1936).
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Impersonal Representations
Where the representation relied upon was of an impersonal char-
acter, i.e., not personally directed to the party seeking to invoke estop-
pel, the courts have consistently, with one notable exception, 9 rejected
the doctrine. 20 In the majority of these cases, the representation relied
upon was in interpretative regulation published by the agency. In re-
jecting estoppel, the courts frequently give as the reason the fact that the
original regulation was erroneous and therefore a nullity, of no effect, or
void.21 Since the question of estoppel arises only when the original
interpretation was erroneous, 22 it is somewhat difficult to see why that
fact should prevent the operation of the principle.
Another reason advanced for rejecting estoppel in cases involving
interpretative regulations has been that affected parties have no right to
rely upon them. For example, it has been stated: 23
... if, under the law, the transfer did result in taxable income to the
plaintiff, any erroneous interpretation of the act by the Treasury Depart-
19 United Fruit Co. v. Hassett, 61 F. Supp. 1013 (D. Mass. 1945). The inter-
pretative regulation relied upon in this case had remained static during three suc-
cessive reenactments of the Revenue Act by Congress, and as such might have been
considered binding under the "reenactment rule." The court chose, however, to rest
its decision upon equitable grounds, observing: "The argument may be put still more
strongly. A taxpayer, in computing his tax liability, follows the statutory provisions
and the interpretative regulations issued pursuant thereto. When the amounts due
are determined, provisions are made for payment. The taxpayer should then be able
to plan the normal operations of his business without the risk of being subjected to
additional tax demands based upon changes in administrative interpretation." Id.
at 1019. The court continued: "The Government equally should be restrained here
from taking an inconsistent position to the taxpayer's detriment. The virtues of
certainty and predictability are too little apparent in the field of tax administration.
Having followed scrupulously both legislative and administrative directions in filing
its return, the plaintiff should be secure in its belief that its tax obligations have
been met." Ibid. The comment of the dissenting judge in the case of Stockstrom v.
Commissioner, 190 F.(2d) 283, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1951) seems especially appropriate to
this decision: "... I wish the law were as the opinion of the court in this case holds
it to be, but I am convinced that it is not."
20 FCC v. WOKO, 329 U.S. 223, 67 S.Ct. 213, 91 L.Ed. 204 (1946); Tonningsen
v. Commissioner, 61 F.(2d) 199 (9th Cir. 1932); Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F.(2d) 691
(W.D. Ky. 1925), ajj'd, 13 F.(2d) 1022 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 721,
47 S.Ct. 111, 71 L.Ed. 858 (1926); Stocker v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1348, 1351
(1928).
21 Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134, 56
S.Ct. 397, 80 L.Ed. 528 (1936); Stocker v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 1348, 1351
(1928).
22 Where the original interpretation was correct and the agency attempts to sup-
plant it with an erroneous one, the language of the applicable statute, rather than
any equitable principle, prevents the change. In the case of Stocker v. Commissioner,
12 B.T.A. 1348, 1351 (1928), the court expressly refrained from stating an opinion
as to the rights of the taxpayer where the regulation relied upon and subsequently
changed was not erroneous.
23 Langstaff v. Lucas, 9 F.(2d) 691, 693 (W.D. Ky. 1925), ajf'd, 13 F.(2d) 1022
(6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 721, 47 S.Ct. 111, 71 L.Ed. 858 (1926).
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ment would not estop the government from asserting the tax, even though
the taxpayer may have been misled by such interpretation. He must have
known that his tax liability was determined by the law, and not by what
some administrative official thought was the law.
While, under the maxim that "everyone is presumed to know the
law," the actual lack of authority inherent in interpretative regulations
would undoubtedly establish a lack of the essential element of reliance,
published regulations formally issued by administrative agencies em-
powered by Congress to effectuate the law would seem to fall squarely
within the situation outlined in the opinion of Horn v. Cole,24 where the
court said: 25
... where a man makes a statement ... in a manner and under circum-
stances such as he must understand those who heard the statement would
believe to be true, and, if they had an interest in the subject, would act on
as true, and one, using his own means of knowledge with due diligence,
acts on the statement as true, the party who makes the statement cannot
show that his representation was false to the injury of the party who
believed it to be true and acted on it as such....
It would seem more logical that the real reason for rejecting a plea of
estoppel in these decisions was the general considerations underlying the
entire field of estoppel against administrative agencies.2 6 However, what-
ever the real reason for judicial refusal to honor reliance upon agency
regulations, the obvious inequity of the situation has prompted Congress
in a few instances to remedy the situation by legislative enactment of the
so-called "good faith" clauses.2 7 Typical of such statutes are the pro-
visions of the Securities Act of 1933, which provides: 28
No provision of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act
done or omitted in good faith in conformity -with any rule or regulation
of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, after
such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or be determined by judicial
or other authority to be invalid for any reason.
Personal Representations
Where the controversy involves a representation made by the
agency to the affected party on a personal basis, the form of the repre-
sentation will affect its.validity as the basis for estoppel.29 Inaction is
24 51 N.H. (3 Shirley) 287 (1868). See 3 PomERoy, op. cit. supra note 11 at 226.
25 51 N.H. (3 Shirley) 287, 300 (1868).
26 See notes 3-5 supra.
27 Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 85 (1933), as amended, 48 STAT. 908 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1946) ; Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 1174 (1939), 15
U.S.C. § 77sss(c) (1946) ; Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 STAT. 88-9 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 258-9 (Supp. 1952). See Tyson, The Good Faith Clauses of the Portal-to-
Portal Act, 22 Tamp. L.Q. 1 (1948), for similar citations and a general discussion
of these clauses.
28 48 STAT. 85 (1933), as amended, 48 STAT. 908 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a)
(1946).
29 A form of agency representation that has frequently been relied upon by
affected parties is the Board ruling or order, involving an actual adjudication of a
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ineffective. The failure of a federal agency to take any action in regard
to a particular situation, even though it had full knowledge of the facts
involved at the time, will not operate as a bar under the doctrine of
estoppel to prevent that same agency from later instituting proceedings.30
The fact that the party invoking the doctrine changed his position
because of the agency's inaction does not affect the validity of the
estoppel.31
In the matter of personal representations, the advisory opinion is one
of the most common upon which reliance is placed. Such advisory opin-
ions have been the mainstay for supplying the demand for authoritative
advice concerning contemplated transactions. Interpretative service
occupies a large part of the work of many administrative agencies. If the
problem upon which the advice is given is one over which the agency
exercises exclusive jurisdiction, as a general rule it can be relied upon
safely since "a reasonable Commission is not likely to prosecute for
reliance in good faith upon an interpretation by the Commission's own
staff."'32 Advisory opinions, however, are not binding upon the agency,
and they have not been successfully used as a basis for estoppel against
an administrative agency.
33
Where the representation by the agency goes beyond inaction or the
voicing of an opinion and involves some positive form of action, such
as the collection of a tax,3 4 the granting of a license,35 the certification of
a bargaining representative, 36 or similar conduct, a change in its posi-
tion on the matter after reliance by the affected party may result in one
specific problem on its merits. When agency officials subsequently attempt a pro-
ceeding which appears to be inconsistent with the Board ruling, a question arises
regarding the application of the doctrine of "res judicata," if the same controversy
is involved, and of "collateral estoppel" where a somewhat different situation has
arisen. The application of these doctrines to administrative agency action is a field
in and of itself worthy of a separate article and no attempt will be made in this
Note to discuss the problem except as it may incidentally arise in cases where the
problem of equitable estoppel is also involved.
30 NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co. 140 F.(2d) 51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 795, 64 S.Ct. 848,88 L.Ed. 1084 (1944).
31 VOm BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1S1A (Supp. 1947).
32 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 49 (1951).
33 Bowles v. Indianapolis Glove Co., 150 F.(2d) 597, 601 (7th Cir. 1945);
Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 131 F.(2d) 651, 658-9 (1st Cir. 1942),
rehearing, 136 F.(2d) 503 (1st Cir. 1943); Burnham Chemical Co. v. Krug, 81 F.
Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1949), ajj'd sub nom. Burnham Chemical Co. v. Chapman, 181
F.(2d) 288 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 826, 71 S.Ct. 60, 95 L.Ed. 606 (1950) ;
Bowles v. Hansen Packing Co., 64 F. Supp. 131 (D. Mont. 1946); Fleming v. Miller,
47 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Minn. 1942), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Walling v.
Miller, 138 F.(2d) 629 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 784, 64 S.Ct. 781, 88
L.Ed. 1076 (1944). See note 32 supra.
34 Schafer v. Helvering, 83 F.(2d) 317 (D.C. Cir.), afj'd, 299 U.S. 171, 57 S.Ct.
148, 81 L.Ed. 101 (1936).
35 Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.(2d) 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
36 Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 65 S.Ct. 238, 89 L.Ed. 216 (1944).
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of two situations which seem to call for the application of equitable
estoppel. The first of these arises where the change is applied prospective-
ly, resulting in an adverse effect upon the party because of his reliance
upon the previous treatment of his case.
This situation is illustrated by Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC,a7
where the agency had granted a license to operate a radio station to a
church. The license was renewed regularly for a period of over twelve
years, during which time the church had made numerous changes in the
administration and operation of the station at the request and direction
of the agency.
Although the station continued to be operated according to the
previous FCC requirements, the agency refused to renew the license in
1943 because of a change of policy. The church's attempt to have the
license renewed on the grounds that the agency should be estopped from
refusing to grant it met with failure before the court.
In another example,38 a taxpayer had, with the full knowledge and
approval of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, filed his tax returns
as a dealer in securities. During the four year period, 1924-1928, this
method of filing had resulted in an increased tax. In 1929, the result
would have been a reduced tax. In this year, the Commissioner, for the
first time, adopted the position that the taxpayer was not entitled to file
as a dealer. Despite the fact that the statute of limitations barred re-
covery of the previously paid taxes by the time the opinion was rendered,
the court upheld the Commissioner's right to change his determination
on the matter.
Where the change in position is applied to the future, the courts have
consistently refused to estop the agency from changing its position, even
though the representation consists of some form of positive action. The
fact that affected parties have changed their positions in reliance thereon
and will suffer some loss because of that reliance is of no avail. The
reason underlying these decisions seems to be most accurately illustrated
by the court in Keystone Automobile Club v. Commissioner: 19
The years . . . have seen the motor vehicle change from a means of
amusement for the well-to-do to a practically universal means of trans-
portation. If the Commissioner cannot change his mind about the relative
place of automobile owners in the scheme of things during that period, he
he is the only human being in America so precluded.
The second situation which may result from a change of position by
the agency in regard to a matter where positive action has already been
taken arises when the agency seeks to apply the change retroactively to
the original transaction. Parties adversely affected by this retroactive
37 160 F.(2d) 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
38 Schafer v. Helvering, 83 F.(2d) 317 (D.C. Cir.), ajj'd, 299 U.S. 171, 57 S.Ct.
148, 81 LEd. 101 (1936).
39 181 F.(2d) 402, 406 (3d Cir. 1950).
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change of position have frequently attempted, on the theory of estoppel,
to prevent the agency from proceeding.
40 A few have been successful,
41
and it is in these cases that the interpretation of the "proper" case is to
be found.
The Problem of Authority
Before proceeding to a discussion of these cases there is one aspect
of the problem which requires consideration because of the frequency
with which it appears in reported decisions. This is the question of the
authority of administrative agencies and their officials, and the majority
of reported cases in the field of estoppel make some comment upon it in
one way or another. Frequently it is treated by the court as the deciding
issue, and the whole question of estoppel is disposed of by an observation
to the effect that in this case the official or the agency was acting outside
the scope of his, or its, delegated authority.42 Very infrequently is the
actual authority set out and the departure shown; 43 rather, the age-old
formula that ". . the United States is neither bound nor estopped by
acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement to do or
cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit .... , is
cited, and the question disposed of without further comment or dis-
cussion.
45
This treatment of the problem has led to considerable speculation,
some of it expressed in judicial opinions, that the "proper" case would
be one in which the action taken by the agency was authorized.46 An
illustration of this is: 47
40 Okonite Co. v. Commissioner, 155 F.(2d) 248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
764, 67 S.Ct. 125, 91 L.Ed. 658, (1946) ; United States v. La Societe Francaise De
Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 152 F.(2d) 243 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 793, 66
S.Ct. 820, 90 L.Ed. 1020 (1946); Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.(2d)
863 (8th Cir. 1944); Sweets Company of America v. Commissioner, 40 F.(2d) 436
(2d Cir. 1930.
41 See Heading, "The Cases," infra.
42 United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31-2, 60 S.Ct. 749, 84 L.Ed. 1050
(1940); Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 S.Ct. 387, 61
L.Ed. 791 (1917); James v. United States, 185 F.(2d) 115 (4th Cir. 1950); United
States v. Jones, 176 F.(2d) 278 (9th Cir. 1949) ; Bowles v. Indianapolis Glove Co.,
150 F.(2d) 597 (7th Cir. 1945); Coleman v. United States, 100 F.(2d) 903 (6th
Cir. 1939); Gudgel v. Iverson, 87 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Ky. 1949).
43 Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 131 F.(2d) 651 (1st Cir. 1942),
rehearing, 136 F.(2d) 503 (1st Cir. 1943); Wells Lamont Corp. v. Bowles, 149
F.(2d) 364, 367 (Em. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730, 66 S.Ct. 37, 90 L.Ed.
434 (1945); Bowles v. Hansen Packing Co., 64 F. Supp. 131 (D. Mont. 1946).
44 Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 S.Ct. 387, 391, 61
L.Ed. 791 (1917).
45 See note 42 supra. If an agent acting without authority cannot bind the gov-
ernment in a specific determination, logically the person relying on this determin-
ation should not be bound either. However, this has been so held only in the unusual
case of Staten Island Hygeia Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. United States, 85 F. (2d)
68 (2d Cir. 1936).
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The acts or omissions of the officers of the government, if they be author-
ized to bind the United States in a particular transaction, will work estop-
pel against the government, if the officers have acted within the scope of
their authority.
The observation is not entirely incorrect. Its value as a guide to the
"proper" case, however, is somewhat lessened by an analysis of its use in
decided cases. In several instances where the previous acts performed by
the agency were authorized, the cases were decided without any reference
to estoppel, the court finding that the authorized character of the acts
made them final and binding.4 8 Although none of these decisions express-
ly passes upon the point, it seems to be a fair inference from the reported
opinions that reliance and detriment as a result of the reliance, or a lack
of these essential elements of estoppel, would be immaterial to the
decision of the case.
Another difficulty is to be found in determining just what authority
an administrative agency has, and more particularly, where that author-
ity lies within the agency. General statements regarding authority or lack
of it add little or nothing to a definition of that quality, or to establish-
ing who in the agency may exercise it. One commentator has analyzed
the situation in a rather extreme manner: 49
"The agency is one great obscure organization with which the citizen
has to deal. It is absolutely amorphous. He pokes it in one place and it
comes out another. No one seems to have specific authority. There is
someone called the commission, the authority; a metaphysical omniscient
brooding thing which sort of floats around 'the air and is not a human
being."
The very obscurity of this element must have led many to conclude that
the courts were taking advantage of an easy solution to the estoppel
problem by disposing of their cases on the basis of a statement that the
agency lacked authority to take the action which it did.
Any implication drawn from these judicial pronouncements regarding
authority that there is someone or some branch in administrative agen-
46 Ritter v. United States, 28 F.(2d) 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1928) ; Walker v. United
States, 139 Fed. 409 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1905); Gudgel v. Iverson, 87 F. Supp. 834
(W.D. Ky. 1949); Barnett Inv. Co. v. Nee, 72 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Mo. 1947);
United States v. Big Bend Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
47 Ritter v. United States, 28 F.(2d) 265, 267 (3d Cir. 1928).
48 H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F.(2d) 831 (6th Cir. 1951); Woodworth v.
Kales, 26 F.(2d) 178 (6th Cir. 1928); Boyne City Lumber Co. v. Doyle, 47 F.(2d)
772 (W.D. Mich. 1930) ; United States v. Detroit Steel Products Co., 20 F.(2d) 675
(E.D. Mich. 1927). Sometimes referred to as "statutory estoppel," this same reason-
ing, namely, that agency change of position is not permitted because of the binding
effect of the authority contained in the statute itself rather than upon any equitable
policy of fairness, is to be found in the case of legislative rules: see note 17 supra
and accompanying text, and good-faith clauses: see note 27 supra and accompanying
text.
41 Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
S. 674, 675, and 918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 807 (1941), as quoted in, DAvis, op. cit.
supra note 17, § 106.
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cies who, or which, could, for example, propound advisory opinions of a
character that could be used as the basis for estoppel against the agency,
would be very misleading. The courts have consistently rejected such
opinions as the basis of estoppel.50 That the courts might in the future
recognize an advisory opinion in a form not yet involved in decided
controversies as a basis for estoppel cannot be unequivocally denied. It
can be stated, however, that the opinions advanced and rejected as a
ground for estoppel have originated in a range of authority from the
"horseback" or "curbstone" variety expressed by a local official, to a
documentary pronouncement by the Commissioner himself.51
As a concluding comment upon this point, it might be asked why the
question of authority should be the deciding issue in any case of estop-
pel. While it is true that the previous action was undertaken without
lack of specific express authority in most of these decisions, the lack of
actual authority is a rather standard characteristic of equitable estoppel
controversies; 52 e.g., the agent who acts beyond the express authority
given him by his principal, but under color of having authority.53 How-
ever, the fact remains that in so far as federal administrative agencies
are concerned this factor is of vital significance. Standing alone, the
presence of authority is not sufficient to bind the agency, but it is an
essential element to the "proper" case.
The Cases
The other elements necessary to that case, as indicated previously,
are to be found in the successful efforts of affected parties to estop the
agencies from reversing their position in regard to matters where positive
action has already been taken. Such cases are not numerous. In fact,
there seems to be a greater paucity of actual cases where an administra-
tive agency was estopped on equitable grounds of injustice to an affected
party than a reference to cases cited in support of this proposition would
indicate. 54 An actual reading of many such cases reveals that the ques-
50 See note 33 supra.
51 Bowles v. Hansen Packing Co., 64 F. Supp. 131 (D. Mont. 1946), where a
local official was called on the phone in regard to the ceiling prices on 4-H cattle,
the court holding no estoppel in relying on such information; as contrasted with
Couzens v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928), where the Commissioner himself,
following extensive investigation, issued a direct official ruling - the court again
holding no estoppel.
52 3 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 11, § 801.
53 Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305 (1882); Nixon v. Brown, 57 N.H. (2 Hall) 34
(1876). This principle is the basis for the present-day Factors Acts, Freudenheim v.
Gutter, 201 N.Y. 94, 94 N.E. 640 (1911).
54 10A MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 60.13 (1948); 1 PIKE
AND FISHER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIGEST (2d) § 2c.4, 8b.16 (1952); 1 VoM BAUnR,
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 252A (Supp. 1947). See cases cited in Stockstrom
v. Commissioner, 190 F.(2d) 283 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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tion of equitable estoppel was not passed upon by the court,5 5 or that
that phase of the problem was treated by the courts in dicta.56 There
appear to be, however, at least three clear examples of the application
of an estoppel on equitable grounds against administrative agencies.
United States v. Brown.57 In 1922, the petitioner was a stockholder
of a corporation which dissolved and distributed its assets. At the time
of the dissolution, the corporation owed unpaid taxes. Since, upon its
dissolution, all the assets of the corporation were distributed to the share-
holders, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue initiated an equitable
action to recover these unpaid taxes from the distributees on the theory
of a trust.
At about the same time, the Commissioner also assessed a deficiency
against the petitioner on the basis of his personal income tax, refusing
to allow as a deduction the amount of the corporation taxes owing to the
government. At one and the same time, the Commissioner was pressing
before two separate courts two inconsistent theories - one that the dis-
tributed assets received by petitioner included corporation taxes im-
pressed with a trust in favor of the government; and the other that
everything which the taxpayer had received from this distribution was
personal income to him.
It appears that the Commissioner, possibly in the interest of con-
serving his legal resources, chose that the equity case should slumber in
the files, and pressed the personal assessment against the petitioner.
Following his successful collection of the tax from petitioner on the
theory that all distributed assets represented personal income, the Com-
missioner then took up the equity suit, arguing that part of the assets
represented taxes owing to the government at the time of the dissolution.
The court refused to entertain the second action on the grounds that: 58
The same amounts could not at once constitute income to the taxpayers
and also be charged with a trust in favor of the Government. The Govern-
ment could bring the transferee action on the theory of trust, or in the
alternative, it could claim that all of the liquidating dividends constituted
personal income to the taxpayers. It could not pursue both courses.
Eickelberger & Co. v. Commissioner.59 In 1930, the petitioner trans-
ferred real estate from itself to another corporation owned entirely by
the same stockholders, realizing a loss of $29,000 on the transaction.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to allow the loss as a
deduction in the petitioner's income tax for that year on the ground that
55 Wurtsbaugh v. Commissioner, 187 F.(2d) 975 (5th Cir. 1951); Woodworth
v. Kales, 26 F.(2d) 178 (6th Cir. 1928).
56 Howell v. Commissioner, 162 F.(2d) 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1947) ; Ford Motor
Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 590, 604 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 636, 56
S.Ct. 170, 80 L.Ed. 452 (1935).
57 86 F.(2d) 798 (6th Cir. 1936).
58 Id. at 799.
59 88 F.(2d) 874 (5th Cir. 1937).
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the unity of ownership between the two corporations rendered the
transaction non-deductible. The petitioners paid their tax accordingly.
Two years later, the property was sold to a third party at a price
which was also about $29,000 less than its tax basis. When the petitioner
deducted the loss from his 1932 tax return, it was again disallowed by
the Commissioner. This time, the reason offered for disallowing the de-
duction was that the actual loss occurred during the 1930 transfer, and
should have been taken then. The inference was that the Commissioner
had- improperly ruled upon the matter in 1930. Although not expressly
stated in the opinion, it would appear from the dates involved that the
Statute of Limitations barred the recovery of the original taxes paid.
The court refused to allow the Commissioner to adopt this change of
position to the detriment of the taxpayer, observing: 60
Whether that decision was right or wrong, the accredited officer of the
United States made it. He cannot justly decide in 1930 that the sale did not
realize the loss and thereby collect increased taxes, and in 1932 decide that
it did realize the loss and collect taxes accordingly again.
Vestal v. Commissioner.61 In June of 1937, the company petitioner
in this case had dissolved its corporate status and reorganized as of the
following date as a partnership. In October of 1938, certain real estate
of the company was sold. The partners paid the income tax upon their
respective shares of the income gained by this sale.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, upon examination of the re-
turns, determined that the petitioner was actually an association taxable
as a corporation and assessed a deficiency in regard to the tax paid on
the real estate sale and other transactions of the company. The petitioner
applied for a refund on the partnership taxes already paid. The claims
for refund were denied, and on appeal the Board of Tax Appeals in 1942,
held that petitioner was taxable as a partnership, expressly declining to
pass upon the question of the real estate sale. Thereafter, the Commis-
sioner, through his proper agent in that area, assessed additional taxes
against the petitioner on the basis that it was a partnership. These taxes
were also paid.
In 1943, the Commissioner again assessed a deficiency against the
petitioner as a transferee of the assets of the dissolved corporation, re-
affirming his original position that the real estate sale was that of the
dissolved corporation. In the meantime, the Statute of Limitations had
run, barring recovery of the previous taxes paid as a partnership. Since
the Board of Tax Appeals in 1942 had specifically declined to pass upon
the question of the real estate sale, res judicata could not bar the Com-
missioner's action. Nevertheless, the circuit court refused to permit the
reassessment because: 62
60 Id. at 875.
61 152 F.(2d) 132 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
62 Id. at 135-6.
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The Commissioner chose to impose the tax upon the theory that the
individuals were liable as partners. Having concluded that imposition, he
cannot later assert that the tax is again due from these same individuals
upon the theory that they are liable as transferees.
The Proper Case
Out of the analysis of these cases, together with a consideration of
the many unsuccessful attempts to invoke an estoppel against federal
administrative agencies, some relatively clear indications of the elements
of the "proper" case can be gleaned. The conclusion seems inescapable
that there is such a case - that its mention in the opinions of various
courts who have passed upon the question is something more than a
"Sirens' Song" to lure unsuspecting attorneys. There is no doubt, how-
ever, that its field of operation is extensively bounded by requirements
of fact, and that the success of a party invoking estoppel against an
administrative agency under any factual situation is in serious jeopardy
from the established judicial policy of reluctance to grant it in this
field.6 3 It must be recognized, of course, that no estoppel will operate in
situations where any of its essential elements are missing.
The first essential is that the representation by the agency must be
in some positive form. Mere inaction, 4 or the furnishing of advice or
opinions 65 is not sufficient.
Secondly, the acts which constitute the agency's representation must
be recognized by the court as authorized. Not only must the act itself
be authorized, but it must be carried into effect by an agency official
actually empowered to perform it. As pointed out previously, although
the fact that the representation was authorized is not, in and of itself,
sufficient to effect an estoppel, it is an essential element of the "proper"
case.
66
Thirdly, the act involved must have been one which personally
affected the party invoking the doctrine. What the agency did in regard
to another party's case or as a general practice is not sufficient.
67
Reliance on the part of the party invoking the doctrine is the fourth
essential; thus, when the evidence before the court indicates that the
affected party has not actually relied upon the previous action by the
agency, estoppel will not be granted.68
63 Id. at 136: "The doctrine of election and estoppel must be applied with great
caution to the Government and its officials. But in proper circumstances it does
apply." See Barnett Inv. Co. v. Nee, 72 F. Supp. 81, 82 (W.D. Mo. 1947).
64 See notes 30 and 31 supra and laccompanying text.
65 See notes 32 and 33 supra and accompanying text.
66 See Heading, "The Problem of Authority," supra.
67 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
68 Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.(2d) 863 (8th Cir. 1944);
Parks-Chambers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 131 F.(2d) 65 (5th Cir. 1942); Couzens v.
Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
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Detriment as a result of such reliance is likewise essential. As a con-
sequence, the failure to show detriment to himself because of the
agency's change in position will defeat the affected party's attempt to
estop the agency. 69 The detriment envisioned must be of a real char-
acter, involving essential injustice to the affected party. The correction
by the agency of a previous erroneous decision which has no other effect
on the party than to leave him in the same position he would have been
in had the first action been correctly taken will not qualify for such
injustice.70 Even where detriment is a possible result, no estoppel will be
granted if the situation is such that the detriment can be avoided by
timely action on the part of the party invoking the doctrine.71
As a sixth element, the changed position taken by the agency must
be in direct contradiction to its original action. All the facts involved
must have been known, or at least available, to the agency at the time of
the first decision. The change in position must have been one which the
agency had a choice to make.72 Changes in position forced upon it by
judicial decision or congressional enactment -will not qualify.73 To this
extent, the "proper" case appears to lie more closely in the field of
election than estoppel.
74
There is one final aspect of the "proper" case not correctly includible
as a legal concept, but one which probably has exerted considerable
influence in the decision of cases in this field. This is the extent of the
court's reliance upon "fair-play" on the part of the administrative agency
to insure that no inequity is committed. In refusing to estop the Internal
Revenue Bureau from collecting income tax from two individuals upon
the same income, it has been observed: 75
That the sums in question have been returned and taxed . . . does not
estop the government from assessing the taxes in question. No such con-
tention is made. Doubtless the Commissioner will make a fair adjustment
of this phase of the matter.
69 Spencer v. Railroad Retirement Board, 166 F.(2d) 342 (3d Cir. 1948);
Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.(2d) 863 (8th Cir. 1944); Arkansas
Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 125 F.(2d) 982 (8th Cir. 1942); Century Electric Co. v.
United States, 75 F.(2d) 589 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 766, 55 S.Ct. 925, 79
L.Ed. 1708 (1935).
70 Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Commissioner, 139 F.(2d) 863 (8th Cir. 1944).
71 By negative implication it would appear that if the Statute of Limitations or
other legal prohibition would not bar a refund, the taxpayer's failure to apply for
it would be a detriment not attributable to the agency. See Vestal v. Commissioner,
152 F.(2d) 132, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
72 See Heading, "The Cases," supra.
73 DAVIS, ADmlINiSTRATIVE LAW § 61 (1951).
74 In Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.(2d) 483; 493 (1st Cir. 1948), the court made
the distinction between these two doctrines: ". . . [Election] is applicable where a
taxpayer [or Commissioner] has had a choice of two methods of computing his tax,
both legal.... Estoppel, on the other hand, applies where there was only one law-
ful course open, which was not followed ... ." See 10A MERTENS, op. Cit. supra note
54, § 60.17.
75 Emery v. Commissioner, 78 F.(2d) 437,438 (1st Cir. 1935).
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In the Vestal case the Tax Court had rejected estoppel on the grounds
that "... the Commissioner should, and no doubt will, take such admin-
istrative action as is necessary to conform to the decision and avoid any
unconscionable double taxation." 76 The circuit court reversed the Tax
Court's holding, estopping the agency from the collection of the second
tax, because "The Commissioner has made no authoritative proposal
that he would take such administrative action." 77
Stockstrom v. Commissioner
In a class by itself stands Stockstrom v. Commissioner.78 It apparent-
ly is a true case of estoppel as distinguished from election.7 9 However,
its validity as an indication of the "proper" case in this field is seriously
impaired by its isolated character. As pointed out in the dissent: 80
I wish the law were as they find it to be, because it is my belief that the
Government ought to set a high standard in its dealings and relationships
with citizens and that the word of a duly authorized Government agent,
acting within the scope of his authority, ought to be as good as a Govern-
ment bond. But unfortunately, as I see it, a long line of cases almost
without exception, beginning with the Couzens case in 1928 and running
down through Schafer v. Helvering and beyond, establish the law other-
wise.
The decision has also been unfavorably commented upon by most law
reviews which have considered it.81
In 1938, Stockstrom made several gifts to trusts which he had
previously established. He filed no gifts tax return in 1938 for these gifts
on the basis of the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
which was reaffirmed in 1941 by accredited agents of the Bureau, that
no return was required. In 1948, the Commissioner changed his prior
position in conformance with a 1941 Supreme Court decision, 82 and
assessed a deficiency on the 1938 gifts made by Stockstrom. In order to
prevent this reassessment, Stockstrom raised the defense of the Statute
of Limitations.
83
The decisive issue thus presented was whether, under the circum-
stances, the running of the Statute of Limitations had been suspended
by the taxpayer's failure to file a return. The court found that the failure
was occasioned by the Commissioner's own conduct on the part of his
76 Chilhowee Mills v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 558, 564, rev'd sub nom. Vestal v.
Commissioner, 152 F.(2d) 132 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
77 Vestal v. Commissioner, 152 F.(2d) 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
78 190 F.(2d) 283 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
79 See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
80 Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F.(2d) 283, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
81 Note, 61 YALE L.J. 1214 (1952); 27 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 137 (1951); 36 MwNu.
L. R v. 428 (1952); 37 VA. L. Rav. 1015 (1951).
82 Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393, 61 S.Ct. 653, 85 L.Ed. 909 (1941).
83 53 STAT. 153 (1939), 26 U.S.C. 1016 (1946).
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accredited agents by assuring Stockstrom that no return need be filed,
and refused to allow the reassessment on the equitable grounds of in-
justice to the taxpayer.
While the language used by the court in its opinion of this case
leaves little doubt that it was decided upon equitable principles of
estoppel, a close analysis of the situation reveals that the same decision
could possibly have been reached by statutory interpretation of the
pertinent provisions regarding failure to file a return. For example, in
Balkan Nat. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner,84 the Statute of Limitations was
held to bar the action, without reference to estoppel, since the govern-
ment's own action caused the failure to file a return. It was stated
that: 85
While literally there has been "a failure to file a return," that phrase
... cannot reasonably be interpreted to include a failure caused by the
Government itself .... The obvious purpose of the section was to give the
revenue officials unlimited time to assess and collect taxes in cases where
the necessary data for determining the amount of the tax was lacking
because of the taxpayer's fault in failing to supply it in the form of a
return.
The main features which distinguish this case from those cited prev-
iously as probably the correct indicia of the "proper" case are: a) the
main representation upon which reliance was placed was merely an
opinion; 86 b) the opinion was that of a subordinate local official; 87 c)
the opinion, when given, was erroneous as a matter of law; 88 and d) the
previous action taken by the agency was not the result of a choice avail-
able to the agency at that time. 9
But -
It is in this last point of distinction that perhaps the most significant
feature of the entire problem is to be found. If a distinction is to be made
between "election" and "estoppel" as is done in several courts, it might,
in truth, be said that the "proper" case in this field is one of election
rather than estoppel, and that the observation, "there is no estoppel
against government agencies" 00 remains unchallenged except by a much
criticized opinion.9 '
Carl F. Eiberger, Jr.
Joseph T. Helling
84 Balkan Nat. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 101 F.(2d) 75 (2d Cir. 1939).
85 Id. at 78.
86 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
87 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
88 See notes 21 and 82 supra and accompanying text.
89 See note 74 supra.
90 See note 2 supra.
91 Stockstrom v. Commissioner, 190 F.(2d) 283 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
